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by Walter H. Diamond 
A MERICAN BUSINESSMEN are frequently startled by the 
impressive number of large and small companies, amount-
ing to some 2,500, that have made direct investments 
abroad since 1960. During the past five years more than 
2,000 United States firms have established businesses in 
Europe alone. Although little publicity is focused on the 
vast quantity of license agreements arranged with foreign 
companies, surveys show that they outnumber new 
overseas investments by nearly three to one. 
Take the case of France since de Gaulle came to power. 
While approximately 350 American businesses were set-
ting up French distributing centers for the European 
Common Market, another 1,000 U.S. firms were negoti-
ating license pacts for patents, trademarks, copyrights, 
designs, technical services, certain types of rentals and 
trade secrets and formulae. In Australia the 850 so-called 
American investors actually consist of only 250 compa-
nies laying out funds for capital investments but with 600 
firms operating through licensees. 
Of course there are numerous reasons why license 
arrangements often gain precedence over direct invest-
ments. Nevertheless, by far the majority of companies are 
quick to admit that the much lower royalty tax on 
patents, trademarks and other services over corporate 
rates is the prime incentive for their decision. 
Generally speaking, the easiest way for an American 
company to find the country which will levy the lowest 
royalty tax on its foreign property rights is to follow the 
line of least resistance — the Income Tax Convention. 
This is why the six nations of the European Economic 
Community offer the most receptive conditions for licens-
ing of U.S. property rights of any other area in the 
world. For instance, under the double taxation treaty 
between the United States and the Netherlands, the 
normal Dutch tax of 15 per cent on royalties does not 
apply on United States residents, corporations or other 
legal entities providing that the recipients do not carry 
on business in the Netherlands through a permanent 
establishment. 
The same basic exemption on royalties from patents, 
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copyrights and trademarks is taken into consideration 
with the other Common Market members, with the 
exception of Luxembourg. Belgium and France also 
exempt the 15 per cent withholding tax when the 
American licensor is not doing business on a "permanent 
establishment" basis. In Western Germany the majority 
of royalties are taxed as business income at the normal 
corporate rates of 51 per cent on undistributed profits and 
15 per cent on distributed profits, plus the municipal 
trade and turnover taxes, with the rates on individual 
licensors ranging from 20 to 53 per cent, in addition to 
several local taxes. However, the normal rates may be 
reduced to 25 per cent in the case of the licensor, or 33/3 
per cent in case the licensee bears the tax. On the other 
hand, by using the far-reaching Income Tax Convention 
facility, all these Federal taxes on the West German 
earnings are circumvented through licensing arrange-
ments. 
A somewhat different situation exists in Italy. The cor-
porate tax rate of 34.68 per cent, including the various 
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but not yet ratified by the Senate, will eliminate the tax 
on industrial property rights. Incidentally, the Luxem-
bourg double taxation treaty is only one of six treaties, 
five of which were signed in 1959 and 1960, which the 
Senate seems to think are unimportant enough to shelve 
ratification indefinitely. 
As an "associate member" of the European Common 
Market, Greece enjoys many of the privileges of the six 
full partners and, therefore, the 180 million consumer 
market of the European Economic Community should 
not be overlooked if a profitable Greek license agreement 
is available. Greece also has an Income Tax Convention 
with the United States and as such, does not tax income 
from U.S. licenses for patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
secret processes, etc., when a "permanent establishment" 
is not involved. If there is a permanent entity, then the 
40/4 per cent corporate tax rate and the 3 to 60 per cent 
rate on individuals and partnerships apply. Spain, which 
has applied for associate membership in the Common 
Market, has no tax treaty with the United States and 
levies a new 14 per cent tax on royalties. 
From the tax viewpoint, therefore, it is obvious that 
the Netherlands, Belgium or France are the choice spots 
to operate in the European Common Market on a 
licensee operation. Moreover, the 15 per cent maximum 
tax in these three countries on industrial property rights 
certainly is much lower than those on earnings from 
capital investment, which average approximately 50 per 
cent. At the same time, since the bulk of license accords 
are completed without "permanent establishments", it is 
safe to say that only one out of fifty American companies 
pays royalty taxes to the Federal Governments in these 
three Common Market distributing centers. 
Among the European Free Trade Association coun-
tries, Switzerland usually is regarded as the most attrac-
tive location in the "Outer Seven" for royalty payments 
on industrial rights. However, the U.S. tax treaties also 
eliminate the royalty tax when a "permanent establish-
ment" does not exist for Americans with licensee ar-
rangements in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom, as well as in Switzerland. The con-
vention with Switzerland eliminates the 27 per cent An-
ticipatory Tax, but the Swiss still withhold the 3 per cent 
Coupon Tax. Sweden eliminates the 30 per cent Coupon 
Tax altogether, while Norway omits the 25 per cent 
tax on non-residents, and Denmark exempts the 22 per 
cent to 44 per cent corporate rates and the extremely 
high personal taxes reaching 110 per cent. The Conven-
tion with the United Kingdom eliminates the 53^4 per 
cent standard corporate tax and the personal taxes 
reaching 88% per cent. 
Austria grants reciprocal exemption "in an amount 
not exceeding fair and reasonable consideration" which 
not always is complete avoidance and could subject the 
licensor to the 15 per cent Capital Returns Tax. Por-
tugal, the remaining member of the "Outer Seven", does 
not have an Income Tax Convention with the United 
States. Chances are it will be several more years before 
the proposed treaty is signed as the Portuguese appear to 
be uninterested in completing negotiations. Meanwhile, 
royalty payments either carry the 15 per cent industrial 
tax from trade and business or the 5 per cent basic cor-
porate rate, plus the 3 to 45 per cent complementary tax. 
Although Switzerland has the reputation as the logical 
choice for property rights arrangements in the European 
Free Trade Association, actually, there are ten times as 
many U.S. companies using Great Britain as their base 
for manufacturing operations through license. On the 
other hand, a familiar pattern employed by many promi-
nent U.S. and Canadian companies is to establish a Swiss 
trading company which owns the patent or license and 
sells its rights to the U.S. company. By employing three 
Income Tax Conventions, the U.S. royalty payments 
may be held abroad freely without being subject to U.S. 
taxes. 
Under the double taxation treaty with Switzerland, 
U.S. royalty transfers are not subject to a withholding 
tax when transferred to the Swiss Company which in 
turn is 100 per cent owned by a Dutch company in the 
Netherlands. The royalties now held by the Swiss com-
pany would be subject to the 3 per cent Anticipatory 
Tax when remitted to the Dutch company under the 
Income Tax Convention between Switzerland and the 
Netherlands. The funds could be held in Holland tax-
lree, and if transferred back to Canada or the United 
States, the Netherlands does not tax the balances now 
treated as dividends under the Income Tax Convention 
with each country. Furthermore, Canada does not tax 
this dividend to the Canadian parent, but the income 
received by the U.S. parent company, of course, would 
be included in the total income subject to the corporate 
tax of 50 per cent. 
Another popular technique that frequently best serves 
American companies having one or more licensed oper-
ators in Europe is use of a combination Swiss trading-
holding company which is 50 per cent owned by the U.S. 
parent and 50 per cent by the licensees. This is generally 
practiced when there are at least four licensees so that 
each may hold a proportionate small share of stock, but 
with their total participation no larger than the 50 per 
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cent requirement to justify non-Subpart F income of the 
parent licensor. 
Any one of the four licensees may use the license of 
the other three, or buy products manufactured by the 
remaining licensees, and the funds paid to the Swiss 
company would be non-taxable by the U.S. Royalties 
and sales commissions are retained by the Swiss com-
pany. Arrangements generally are made by the parent 
with each licensee so that its interest in the Swiss com-
pany is offset by increased royalties. Sometimes, the U.S. 
parent prefers to give only 48 per cent or 49 per cent of 
the voting stock to the licensees and 2 per cent or 1 per 
cent respectively to a Swiss bank. However, any pre-
arrangement of switch share voting must be avoided to 
justify U.S. Treasury requirements of a non-U.S. foreign 
controlled corporation. 
When the Latin American Free Trade Association was 
created by the Treaty of Montevideo in February, 1960, 
nearly every one of the nine members had visions of 
some day becoming the principal distributing center for 
this Common Market. At that time, each pledged to do 
its utmost to ban its complicated tax system and strive 
toward an eventual harmonization of taxes on income 
and industrial rights. Their pledges were later reiterated 
with the signing of the Alliance for Progress. 
Despite the shortcomings of the Alliance for Progress, 
one of the few areas where worthwhile achievements 
must be recognized is the elimination of the maze of 
taxes long hindering the development of several Latin 
American Republics. Nevertheless, only Argentina and 
Ecuador of the nine LAFTA members today can boast 
of a single tax on royalties. The other seven still apply a 
series of basic taxes, surtaxes and supplementary levies 
on earnings from industrial rights. 
In the complete absence of double taxation treaties 
between the United States and the LAFTA participants, 
although Conventions with Mexico and Chile are about 
ready to be signed with the U.S., tax considerations play 
a less important part in choosing a Latin American com-
pany to share a license than in chosing a European coun-
try. Argentina imposes a flat tax of 38.36 per cent on 
royalties, and Ecuador levies the 35 or 36 per cent remit-
tance tax. However, the broad tax concessions offered the 
foreign licensor by the Industrial Encouragement Law 
places Ecuador probably in the choice location for distrib-
uting licensed products within LAFTA. Not only does 
Brazil impose a 28 per cent basic tax, a 5 per cent addi-
tional tax and a 15 per cent compulsory loan on royalty 
transfers, but remittance restrictions now make license 
arrangements prohibitive. 
Chile levies the 33 per cent basic tax, plus complemen-
tary taxes totaling nearly another 10 per cent. Colombia 
and Peru tax royalties at the same high normal rates on 
business profits which average between 40 and 50 per cent 
while Paraguay requires the corporate rate of 25 per cent 
on earnings from industrial rights. 
The socially progressive Republic of Uruguay has de-
vised a rather ingenious way to collect on royalty pay-
ments. Although the 10 per cent basic rate, plus the 
5 to 50 per cent complementary tax, constitute the 
normal taxes on royalties, non-resident licensors receive 
special dispensation. They are entitled to reductions up 
to 50 per cent if the licensor satisfies tax authorities that 
he incurred expenses in Uruguay. If the licensor had no 
expenses in Uruguay, the withholding tax is 20 per cent 
on 95 per cent of the royalty, or slightly more than 18 
per cent on the total remittance. Notwithstanding eco-
nomic, labor and exchange crises, Uruguay thus becomes 
the most advantageous LAFTA country to license tax-
wise. 
But like Uruguay, where nationalization policies 
threaten U.S. business, Mexico too, is more attractive 
for licensing and technical servicing arrangements than 
direct investments. In the past eighteen months there 
have been two technical agreements for every capital 
investment made by an American firm in Mexico. Al-
though the new Mexican Profit Sharing Law, in which 
workers receive a share of annual company profits, is 
not quite as burdensome as expected, it undoubtedly is 
a deterrent to U.S. capital outlays and will continue to 
intensify as a menace. Meanwhile, royalties earned from 
licensing are taxed from 20 to 55 per cent, while non-
resident foreigners receiving income from technical as-
sistance are subject to a 10 per cent withholding tax on 
the gross amount. In addition, both types of arrange-
ments are subjected to another 3 per cent on gross royal-
ties paid by Mexican entities to companies residing 
abroad. 
The Central American Common Market consisting of 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua does have a member with a treaty avoiding 
double taxation with the United States. An Income Tax 
Convention signed with Honduras in 1956 — and almost 
terminated recently, but continued after the sudden 
about-face of the Hondurans — exempts the regular in-
dividual and corporate taxes on royalties and other 
amounts received from use of copyrights, patents, trade-
marks and similar industrial property. 
From the tax standpoint, as a result of the treaty, 
Honduras is the number one site for distribution of your 
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product through licensing in the Central American Pro-
gram of Economic Integration, better known as the 
Central American Common Market. But Costa Rica 
not only offers the best market, but also has the broadest 
tax and investment concessions as well as an excellent 
supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Many U.S. com-
panies believe that these inducements overshadow the 
absence of an Income Tax Convention and prefer to be 
subjected to the 30 per cent business tax on royalty 
earnings, thus choosing Costa Rica over Honduras as a 
distributing center. 
In addition to the Honduran and Canadian tax 
treaties, the United States has one more in the Western 
Hemisphere that is destined to come into more promi-
nence in the near future. American companies will find 
particularly beneficial the pending protocol with the 
Netherlands Antilles of the Income Tax Convention 
with the Netherlands extended to cover the Antilles in 
1955. Under Article I of the Protocol, royalty income 
derived from sources within the United States is com-
pletely exempt from the 30 per cent withholding tax if 
the payer of such income is a U.S. corporation which 
has 25 per cent or more of its stock owned by the Nether-
lands Antilles corporation. As in the case of the previ-
ously mentioned Swiss trading-holding company, the 
Netherlands Antilles company first would have to own 
the license by arrangement with a United States or 
foreign company. 
Use of a foreign or personal holding company not only 
in the Netherlands Antilles, but also in Panama, and 
particularly the Bahamas, frequently plays an integral 
part of industrial rights arrangements. Under Section 
954 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1962, rents or royalties 
derived in the active conduct of a trade or business, 
which are received from an unrelated person, or one 
who owns no more than 50 per cent of the combined 
voting power of all stock, are not taxable as imaginary 
income, or on a current basis. This is especially beneficial 
when the U.S. parent does not wish to bring the royalty 
income home but to build it up tax-free or re-invest it 
tax-free in a so-called "less-developed" country. Instead 
of paying the 50 per cent corporate tax when remitted 
by the foreign holding corporation in the Bahamas, the 
parent only is -subjected to the 30 per cent withholding 
tax on royalties paid to the subsidiary. 
While the procedure is acceptable if the U.S. company 
is widely held, one must avoid it if the parent is a closely 
held corporation. Should it be closely held by five or less 
individuals owning 50 per cent or more, then the Ba-
hamanian corporation is a personal holding company 
and subject to the 70 per cent flat personal holding 
income tax rate effective under Section 341 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1964. 
The African Common Market, better known as the 
Casablanca Powers, comprising Ghana, Guinea, Mali 
and Morocco, started out in a hurry in 1962 to abolish 
tariffs, exchange technical assistance and revamp their 
extremely low corporate tax rates which generally are 
imposed on royalty income from patents, copyrights, 
trade secrets and like property. Historically, the Africans 
prefer to cover their expenditures by collecting sizeable 
and all-inclusive duties on most commodities—a carry-
over from slave traffic days. Unfortunately, little eco-
nomic progress has been made to date in any of the 
above areas. With no Income Tax Conventions, U.S. 
companies are subject to the normal corporate rates of 
roughly 30 per cent or 40 per cent, of course excluding 
all oil royalties which must be considered separately. 
Shortly after the creation of the African Common 
Market, Nasser had designs of making Egypt the leader 
of this regional trading area. He immediately put to work 
three committees in Cairo to complete details for an 
enlarged common market. Stymied by the Casablanca 
Powers from the outset, Colonel Nasser is forced to 
depend on the Arab League for his regional trading 
market. Unlike the Central American Common Market, 
there is not a single country among the Casablanca 
Powers or the Arab League that is especially conducive 
for licensing arrangements because of tax reductions 
resulting from treaties. In practically all of the nations 
the business taxes ranging from 30 to 50 per cent apply. 
However, in Iran certain approved industries may re-
ceive 50 per cent tax exemption. Moreover, rental in-
come is subject to a flat 9 per cent. Although several 
United States Income Tax Conventions have been pro-
posed with Middle Eastern countries, only one with Israel 
has been signed, but not yet ratified by the U.S. Senate. 
When this does become effective, the 25 per cent rate 
on royalties will be reduced to 15 per cent. 
In the Far East, the three-nation common market, 
which exists in the form of a customs union between/ 
the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, offers no tax 
treaty advantages. On the other hand, most of the 
Far Eastern nations grant special tax concessions on 
technical assistance arrangements in important industrial 
development. The Philippines did not renew the law 
expiring in 1958 which fully exempted "new and neces-
sary industries" from the current 30 per cent withholding 
tax on royalty income on foreign corporations not doing 
business with the Philippines and having no branch or 
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office there. Taiwan does reduce the 25 per cent normal 
tax to 18 per cent on royalty income for most industries 
falling under the Republic of China Statute for Encour-
agement of Investment. 
Three important Income Tax Conventions of the U.S. 
do exist with key Far Eastern nations whose total number 
of licensees of American property come close to 1,000. 
Another, with India, was signed in 1959 but not yet 
ratified. However, of these four treaties, only the one 
with Pakistan exempts the tax on royalties for the use of 
patents, copyrights, designs, secret processes or formulae, 
trademarks and similar property. 
The taxation of royalties on the majority of industrial 
property in varying amounts under the remaining three 
Far Eastern treaties—Australia, New Zealand and India 
—emphasize that advantages are not always synonymous 
with Tax Conventions. In fact, sometimes there are 
disadvantages. Australia's treaty is a typical example of 
the pitfalls that exist in assuming you are protected from 
excessive taxation without analyzing each Convention as 
a separate document. The Australian agreement only 
exempts royalties for the use of producing a literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work in which copyrights 
subsist. Royalties from rental property or exploitation of 
mines or natural resources may elect to be subject to the 
tax of the other party on a net basis as if that resident 
were engaged in trade or business through a permanent 
establishment. Thus, on royalty income from Australia, 
United States residents pay the normal 40 per cent tax. 
A U.S. subsidiary would pay the 40 per cent corporate 
tax rate and withhold another 40 per cent on the remit-
tance to the American licensor. As in many Conventions, 
such as is the case of the Canadian treaty, there is no 
reference to royalties from patents, trade secrets, trade 
marks and similar industrial property. 
Although the Convention with New Zealand taxes the 
same rights and contains the same minimum exclusions 
as are covered in the Australian treaty, it also exempts 
rentals from motion picture films. Royalties from mines, 
natural resources, copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc. 
are subject to the ordinary income tax rates of 42 J/2 per 
cent on business income. On the other hand, rentals from 
motion picture films are exempted in New Zealand but 
there is no exemption on this income in the Australian 
Convention. 
In fact, a study of the 26 U.S. Income Tax Conven-
tions now in effect and those signed but not ratified 
reveals that for about one-third the tax on motion pic-
tures can not exceed 50 per cent of the statutory rate 
imposed on such rentals. One third of these Conventions 
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allow no exemptions, as with Canada which has a 15 
per cent rate on royalties, and in the case of the Indian 
treaty whereby a 50 per cent income tax and supertax 
are levied, and the remaining third provide either for 
complete exemption or a reduction. For instance, in the 
case of the Japanese treaty, the maximum tax on all 
royalties other than on natural resources is reduced to 
15 per cent. In specified cases the rate on Japanese 
royalties is still further cut to 10 per cent—a substantially 
lower rate than the 38 per cent corporate rate on direct 
investments. However, the 12 per cent local Enterprise 
Tax applies both on royalties and business profits. 
This underlines another fallacy regarding royalty ex-
emptions on licenses and technical services when Income 
Tax Conventions are in effect. Since the treaties cover 
Federal taxes only, many U.S. firms overlook the exist-
ence of municipal, provincial, cantonal or other local 
taxes. Sometimes the tax burden on patents and tech-
nical service agreements may turn out to be much heavier 
than expected despite the elimination of taxes through 
Conventions. Moreover, many countries apply their turn-
over taxes on top of the local taxes. For instance, in Italy 
one may believe there is complete exemption but the local 
and turnover taxes come to 8.625 per cent. Belgium levies 
its 6 per cent turnover tax on royalties and West Germany 
imposes its 4 per cent turnover and 1 per cent net worth 
tax. 
Changes in tax systems or the discovery of abuses in 
existing treaties frequently require revisions. Right now 
the Conventions with the Netherlands, West Germany 
and Canada are under review. These modifications can 
distort an entire tax picture on license agreements. 
Therefore, over-dependence in linking royalty arrange-
ments to tax treaties creates a hazard that sometimes 
becomes disastrous. As an example, the proposed increase 
in the Netherlands dividend tax may at some time later 
spread to royalty income. 
Today, many countries take a firm tax position in 
respect to patent royalties versus service fees. Under 
special instructions issued by the Indian Government in 
New Delhi, royalty payments to foreign collaborators are 
singled out as having distinction from fees for services 
rendered abroad by a foreign collaborator. The element 
of royalty as such as in the use of patents is fully taxable 
but the element of fees for services is exempt from tax 
in India. 
India's tax position is such that even if the licensing 
agreement is entered into and the royalties are payable 
outside India the royalty income arises in India because 
the patent is used within the country. In the renowned 
37 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (India) Ltd. case, the Bombay 
High Court upheld that licensing in India constitutes a 
business connection and as such is subject to normal 
business taxes. 
Brazil's new remittance law takes the position that 
royalty payments due for patents of inventions, industrial 
and commercial trademarks or similar payments depend 
on submission of proof by the interested party that the 
respective privileges have not expired in the country of 
origin. As is generally known, remittances for payment 
of royalties for use of patents, trademarks and similar 
rights are not permitted between a branch or subsidiary 
of a company established in Brazil and its Head Office 
abroad, or when the majority of the company's capital 
in Brazil belongs to the recipients of the royalties abroad. 
Of course, this stand stems from the acute exchange 
crisis in Brazil. Instead of raising royalty taxes still fur-
ther, it prefers to keep the royalties in Brazil altogether. 
Certain fees for services by U.S. companies are not 
block by the profit remittance law in Brazil. Further-
more, there are many other devious yet legal methods 
such as finders' fees, Brazilian stock purchases and cru-
zeiro loans to effect transfers. 
Another royalty tax problem frequently encountered 
evolves from computation. In some cases, taxable in-
come from royalties is computed according to the net 
worth comparison method. I t is the custom in other 
nations to figure taxable income as the excess of gross 
income over income-connected expenses. Usually the 
method of calculation depends upon the category of 
taxable income under which it is classified. The two 
systems vary widely. 
West Germany, where both methods are practiced, is 
a clear-cut example of the differences. Here certain 
valuation rules apply and a write-down of the intangible 
property to lower value is permitted under specific con-
ditions. Moreover, the expenditures incurred in the in-
vention may be capitalized and thus secure a cost basis 
in case of sale of the patent later. If the expenditures 
result in an operating loss, the latter may be carried 
forward to the following five taxable years. 
Under the second method, registration fees for the 
patent, copyright or process, as well as research and 
development expenses, are deductible as inter-connected 
expenses. If expenditures incurred before income from 
the patent result in a loss after the deduction, then the 
loss may be offset against other income in the same 
taxable year. 
An unforeseen problem on patent, copyright and 
trademarks that many Americans do not count upon is 
the annual renewal of taxes on most licenses. Renewal 
taxes on patents, frequently called annuities in some 
nations, can be expensive in each country and when 
several are involved can mount into thousands of dollars 
of taxes annually. 
With the creation of various common markets around 
the globe, there probably is no question today more 
thoroughly debated yet so remotely resolved than tax 
harmonization. The six members of the European Eco-
nomic Community have pledged to harmonize turnover 
taxes this year. Although Article 99 of the Treaty of 
Rome calls for a broad reform and unification of all 
taxes, little headway has been made in discussion on 
most taxes, including levies on royalties. Target date for 
a single royalty tax on property rights is 1970. 
Actually, the nine members of the Latin American 
Common Market have made more progress toward 
reforms and unfication than the "Inner Six" participants 
of Europe. Five Latin countries already have approved 
new taxes by simplifying their systems, with emphasis on 
income taxes but affecting royalties. Two members of the 
"Outer Seven" also have lowered taxes on industrial 
property since the European Free Trade Association was 
created. In view of the past history of the creeping 
progress towards tax harmony among all countries of the 
world when not under Income Tax Convention coercion, 
it is most doubtful that any of the nine regional trading 
areas will ever reach any degree of unity on royalty 
taxes. Integration of property rights taxes is bound to be 
a long drawn-out problem and the wide disparities of 
today are likely to be with us in the nineteen-seventies. 
Because of the wide divergencies in tax rates ranging 
from complete exemption to as much as 80 per cent, and 
in view of frequent political confrontation, there is a 
greater need than ever for guarantees and concessions 
of industrial rights by respective governments. Although 
exactly 68 nations have passed investment encourage-
ment laws in the post-war era to attract U.S. investment, 
only a handful cover royalties from patent licenses, trade-
marks, copyrights and similar property. In their desire 
to lure private American capital, many foreign nations 
concentrate on "tax holidays" for direct investment in 
industry, but neglect local manufacturing through 
licensing. 
As is well known, guarantees to protect rights are 
almost totally lacking in many areas of the world. Al-
though several movements belatedly have sprung up 
urging less-developed nations to stop recent nationaliza-
tion threats, such as witnessed in Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Peru, Boliva, Ceylon, Indonesia and even 
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Zanzibar little progress is expected in halting seizures. 
U.S. companies would be wise to investigate the use of 
protection under Investments Guarantees Division of the 
Agency of International Development. While guarantees 
for licensing patents, trademarks and technical services 
have been available since 1948 under the original Foreign 
Assistance Act, they are seldom used. On the other hand, 
$1.5 billion worth of similar guarantees have been issued 
for direct investment. There is no doubt that for the 
small charge of *4 per cent each for guarantees covering 
expropriation, war or inconvertibility of currency, it is 
a worthwhile investment on your part to be assured that 
you will actually receive your income after the foreign 
tax deductions from property held abroad. 
While taxes levied by foreign countries on profits from 
patents, trademarks, copyrights and licenses are your 
chief consideration, of course there are numerous steps 
that American business also must weigh in minimizing 
the U.S. tax burden on overseas income from property 
and services. In addition to the foreign tax credit taken 
against United States taxes paid, it is frequently helpful 
to decontrol a patent-holding company by exchanging 
stock for equity in the licenses. By allowing native inter-
ests in a foreign investment company to own patents 
locally, royalty income from licenses will not be taxed 
currently in the United States. 
Sometimes it is advisable to integrate foreign manu-
facturing with leasing operations. This permits rental 
income by both producer or leasing subsidiary to be 
classified as non-foreign personal holding company. More-
over there are several frequently practiced techniques 
that may reduce or eliminate the accrual of Foreign 
Base Company services income to a Controlled Foreign 
Corporation from use of technical, managerial or com-
mercial services outside its country of incorporation for 
or on behalf of related persons. Among these are: 
(1) integrating manufacturing and services 
companies; 
(2) routing service income through a manufacturing 
subsidiary in a low tax country; 
(3) meeting the provisions of the 20 - 80 per cent test 
under which no part of services income is Foreign 
Base Company services income if less than 20 
per cent of all services are performed outside the 
country of incorporation; and finally, 
(4) realizing Foreign Base Company services income 
through the escape hatch provisions of minimum 
distribution. 
In order to facilitate the use of this information as a 
handy reference, we have listed the tax rates levied on 
royalties by the respective countries comprising the 
several Common Markets as well as three other general 
areas. We also have indicated the most favorable sites 
for license arrangements in each of these regional trading 
I. European Economic Community (Inner Six) 
Federal Tax on Royalty Payments to United States 
No permanent 
Country establishment 
1. Netherlands* None 
2. Beligum* None 
3. France* None 
With permanent 
establishment 
15% 
15% 
15% 
4. West Germany None 5 1 % undistributed plus 
15% distributed 
(Corporate) 
20 to 53% (Individual) 
5. Italy 4.725% 23% (Corporate) 
18.55% (Individual) 
6. Luxembourg 12% 12% 
Greece (Associate None 40/4% (Corporate) 
member) 3 to 60% (Individual) 
Spain (Applicant 14% 14% 
for membership) 
II . European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven) 
Federal Tax on Royalty Payments to United States 
Country 
1. Switzerland* 
2. Sweden 
3. Norway 
4. Denmark 
No permanent 
establishment 
3% 
None 
None 
With permanent 
establishment 
30% 
30% 
25% 
None 22 to 44% (Corporate) 
Up to 110% (Individual) 
5. United Kingdom* None 533/4% (Corporate) 
U p to 883/4% (Individual) 
6. Austria None 15% 
7. Portugal 15% 15% (from trade or 
business) 
5% plus 3 to 45% 
(Corporate) 
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I I I . Latin 
1. Argentina 
2. Ecuador* 
3. Brazil 
4. Chile 
5. Colombia 
6. Peru 
7. Paraguay 
8. Uruguay* 
9. Mexico 
American Free Trade Association** 
With or without permanent establishment 
38.36% 
35 or 36% 
28% plus 5% plus 15% 
33% plus 10% 
l/i to 5 1 % plus 20 to 56% excess profits 
tax (Individual) 
12 to 36% plus 20 to 56% excess profits 
tax (Corporate) 
5 to 35% plus 15% complementary tax 
25% 
10% plus 5 to 50% reduced to 19% 
20 to 55% and 10% on technical 
assistance 
1. Costa Rica* 
2. El Salvador 
3. Guatemala 
4. Honduras* 
5. Nicaragua 
IV. Central America Common Market 
With or without permanent establishment 
30% 
20% 
5 to 48% 
None — (30% if permanent establish-
ment for individual or corporation) 
4 to 30% 
V. Other Western Hemisphere 
1. Netherlands 
Antilles* 
2. Panama 
3. Bahamas 
4. Canada* 
No permanent 
establishment 
3% 
2 to 35% 
30% 
15% 
With permanent 
establishment 
3 % plus 30% 
2 to 35% 
30% 
15% 
VI . Africa Common Market** 
With or without permanent establishment 
2 / 2 to 30% (Individual) 
40% (Corporate) 
30% (may be reduced by agreement) 
30 to 40% 
3.65 plus 1/4% 
1. Ghana 
2. Guinea 
3. Mali 
4. Morocco* 
VI I . Arab League** 
With or without permanent establishment 
I .Egypt 22.2% 
2. Lebanon 5 to 42% 
3. I ran* 12 to 50% (Reduced by 50%) 
4. Iraq 10 to 40% (non-resident individual) 
10 to 30% (Corporate) 
5. Syria 6 to 36% 
6. Saudi Arabia 20% 
V I I I . Other Middle East** 
With or without permanent establishment 
1. Israel* 25% 
IX. Far East Common Market** 
With or without permanent establishment 
1. Thailand 10 to 50% (Individual) 
15 to 25% plus 1/2% of gross receipts 
(Corporate) 
2. Philippines* 30% 
3. Malaysia 40% (average for 4 member nations) 
X. Other Far East 
With or without permanent establishment 
1. Taiwan 6 to 25% (reduced to 18% for certain 
industries) 
2. India 50% 
3. Pakistan* None (If permanent establishment then 
2 to 75% for individual and 50 or 
60% for corporate) 
4. Australia 40% (Individual) 
40% (each by subsidiary and parent for 
corporation) 
5. New Zealand 42/a% 
6. Japan* 15% (38% if permanent establishment) 
* Most favored site for license arrangement within re-
spective Common Market or area. 
** No Income Tax Convention presently in effect with 
U.S. within respective Common Market or area so 
that rate is same whether with or without permanent 
establishment. 
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